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Abstract Although systematic policy evaluation has been conducted for decades
and has been growing strongly within the European Union (EU) institutions and in
the member states, it remains largely underexplored in political science literatures.
Extant work in political science and public policy typically focuses on elements
such as agenda setting, policy shaping, decision making, or implementation rather
than evaluation. Although individual pieces of research on evaluation in the EU
have started to emerge, most often regarding policy “effectiveness” (one criterion
among many in evaluation), a more structured approach is currently missing. This
special issue aims to address this gap in political science by focusing on four key
focal points: evaluation institutions (including rules and cultures), evaluation actors
and interests (including competencies, power, roles and tasks), evaluation design
(including research methods and theories, and their impact on policy design and
legislation), and finally, evaluation purpose and use (including the relationships be-
tween discourse and scientific evidence, political attitudes and strategic use). The
special issue considers how each of these elements contributes to an evolving gover-
nance system in the EU, where evaluation is playing an increasingly important role
in decision making.
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Die Politisierung von Evaluation: Debattenbeiträge zur Konstruktion
von EU-Policy-Performanz
Zusammenfassung Obwohl systematische Policy-Evaluation bereits seit vielen
Jahrzehnten betrieben wird und insbesondere innerhalb der Institutionen der Eu-
ropäischen Union (EU) und der EU-Mitgliedstaaten stark gewachsen ist, wird sie
weiterhin größtenteils von der politikwissenschaftlichen Literatur vernachlässigt. Be-
stehende Arbeiten in der Politikwissenschaft und der Policy-Analyse konzentrieren
sich meist auf andere Themen, wie Agenda-Setting, Policy-Entstehung, politische
Entscheidungsprozesse oder die Implementierung öffentlicher Politiken. Während an
einigen Stellen vereinzelte Forschungsarbeiten zur Evaluation in der EU erscheinen,
die sich meist auf Policy-Effektivität konzentrieren (ein Kriterium unter vielen), fehlt
bisher ein strukturierter Ansatz. Das aktuelle PVS-Schwerpunktheft stößt in diese
Forschungslücke und konzentriert sich auf vier Schlüsselaspekte: Evaluationsinsti-
tutionen (inklusive ihrer Regeln und Kulturen), Evaluationsakteure (Kompetenzen,
Macht, Aufgaben, Interessen und Interaktionen), Evaluationsmethoden und -theo-
rien (inklusive Folgenabschätzung und deren Einfluss auf das Policy-Design und
Gesetzgebung) und zum Schluss Evaluationszwecke und -nutzen (inklusive der Be-
ziehung zwischen Diskurs und wissenschaftlicher Evidenz, politische Einstellungen
und strategischem Nutzen). Das Schwerpunktheft betrachtet, inwiefern diese Ele-
mente zur Entwicklung des EU-Governance-Systems beitragen, in dem Evaluation
eine immer wichtigere Rolle in Entscheidungsprozessen spielt.
Schlüsselwörter EU-Institutionen · Performanz · Evalationsdebatten · Lernen ·
Evaluationsverwendung
1 Introduction
Despite new forms of governance becoming increasingly important for the pro-
duction of collective goods, their effectiveness and efficiency seem to be limited
(Grande 2012). As a result, “modern societies must be afraid of having been caught
in a ‘governance trap’” (Grande 2012, p. 565). This debate is of particular relevance
to the European Union (EU), where, beyond pure efficiency concerns, issues of
quality, independence, objectivity and scope are crucial for the throughput and out-
put legitimacy of its governance and policy making (Schmidt 2013). The quality of
policy outputs therefore depends in good measure on the quality of governance. The
end of “permissive consensus” (Hooghe and Marks 2009) on European integration
and the rise of Euroscepticism make demonstrating the effectiveness and efficiency
of EU policies politically more challenging. According to the Oxford English Dic-
tionary, we understand a (EU-level) public policy to be “a principle or course of
action adopted or proposed as desirable, advantageous, or expedient; esp[ecially]
one formally advocated by a government, political party, etc.” Note, however, that
there is a wide-ranging discussion on the meaning of public policy in the relevant
policy literatures (Hill and Varone 2017, pp. 15–23).
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How do we go about ascertaining how well a policy performed, or indeed, if it
was a well-designed policy? Many have argued that evaluation—here understood
as “the process of determining the merit or worth or value of something; or the
product of that process” (Scriven 1981)—has a key role to play in the objective
and systematic assessment of public policy. Yet while policy evaluation (hereafter
“evaluation[s]” for brevity) has often been heralded as a key ingredient of successful
governance, it nonetheless remains heavily contested by political actors who are
prone to conduct and use evaluations strategically. Contrary to those who have
sought to depict evaluation as a mere technical exercise, politics is inherent in any
governance practice aimed at measuring and deliberating the performance legitimacy
of public policy, and especially that of the EU (Bovens et al. 2006; Scharpf 2009;
Vedung 1997). Political differences may emerge, for example, over the underlying
“values” that evaluation uses in its assessment (see Majone 1989). There are many
values and principles that can be used in an evaluation, ranging from economic ideas
on efficiency to effectiveness against stated political objectives, as well as more
processual approaches such as criteria of fairness, equity, or democratic legitimacy.
Depending on the values applied, the results of an evaluation may differ starkly,
generating interest-based preferences for some evaluation approaches and outcomes
over others.
Such differences emerge especially because any number of different values might
crucially also conflict with one another. The political challenge therefore involves
forging political and societal agreement on the values that should, in turn, underlie
evaluation (see Fischer 2006). Reflecting such dynamics, evaluation in the EU grew
spectacularly in the 1990s and 2000s, driven by the quest for accountability and
learning but also by a demonstrable desire of political actors to “manipulate politi-
cal opportunity structures” (Schoenefeld and Jordan 2019; see also Stame 2003 and
Stern 2009). More recently, the perceived and argued-for importance of policy eval-
uation has been exacerbated by a shift towards austerity in many European countries
in the aftermath of the financial crisis that began in 2008 (Streeck and Schäfer 2013).
As a result, demonstrating “value for money” has become increasingly important.
Political pressure to demonstrate a “Europe of Results” goes hand in hand with po-
litical divergence over how to demonstrate results—and therein we have politics in
the governance of evaluation, impacting not only upon the tendering and managing
of policy evaluation (Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017) but also on determining both
the decision making for conducting evaluation (or not) and the use (or non-use) of
its findings.
Certain political motivations within public management have driven policy ap-
praisal (ex ante evaluation), making it an “inherently political phenomenon” with
actors shaping appraisal structures and practices to suit their interest-based prefer-
ences (Adelle et al. 2012). Conducting good policy assessments, which are then
used to inform policy, depends largely on having sufficient institutional capacities
and resources, as well as on leadership and political will. In other words, policy
evaluation is intrinsically linked to deliberative processes within institutional set-
tings—of designing policy and legislating (ex ante) and, thereafter, of implementing
and monitoring, auditing, and scrutinising policy outputs (ex post) as part of the ac-
countability regime, both normatively as a virtue and procedurally as a mechanism
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(Bovens 2010; see also Stame 2006). Although some aspects of evaluation (such as
impact assessment) have received greater attention in the political science literature
than others, a more comprehensive treatment of evaluation in all its forms remains
scarce. For example, research outputs in key public policy journals have tended to
focus on the earlier stages of the policy cycle: agenda setting, policy formulation,
policy decision making, and implementation (see Sabatier 2007). This has generated
veritable gaps in scholarly debate and in knowledge on aspects of evaluation as one
crucial aspect of policy making and the associated politics.
Why is there such a dearth of research into the political dynamics and tensions
within the theory and practice of policy evaluation, especially in the field of political
science? Some EU policy scholars may in fact be conducting aspects of evaluation
research without realising it or without framing their work explicitly as such; for
example, when writing on the impact of the Structural Funds in cohesion policy
(Fratesi and Wishlade 2017; Hoerner and Stephenson 2012) or on the effectiveness
of EU missions in external action (Batterbury 2006; Peen Rodt 2014). Beyond the
immediate communities of European integration studies and EU public policy com-
munities, certain public administration scholars have recently turned their attention
to the efficiency of public sector organisations while a community of evaluation
scholars has largely focused on methodological questions of evaluation practice.
This special issue addresses this fragmentation by combining articles from leading
scholars of public administration, political science, public policy, and evaluation (for
earlier related efforts, see Hoerner and Stephenson 2012; Vaessen and Leeuw 2010;
Dahler-Larsen 2011) to explore four key themes concerning the state of policy
evaluation in the EU:
1. Evaluation institutions—including the rules for evaluation, the contestation of new
evaluation institutions and their fight for legitimacy, organisation and practices of
active scrutiny at the policy level, and evaluation cultures.
2. Evaluation actors and interests—including the competencies, power, and trans-
formation of public and private evaluation communities, as well as the effects
of increased competition in evaluation on intra-institutional and inter-institutional
politics, roles, and tasks.
3. Evaluation design—including the approach to, and purpose of, evaluation, as de-
termined by research methods, theories and data collection, and their impact on
policy design and legislation.
4. Evaluation purpose and use—including the relationships between discourse and
scientific evidence, political attitudes and evaluation practice, as well as the strate-
gic use of policy evaluation results, findings and recommendations.
2 Bridging Political Science and Evaluation Studies: Institutions,
Actors, Design, and Use
So what is the existing divide across disciplines? What exactly is it that needs to be
bridged? Both political science and evaluation studies stand to gain from engaging
with one another in multiple areas of theory and practice. First, given the growing
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interest in “evaluation systems” (Leeuw and Furubo 2008; Olejniczak 2013), there
are potential links with debates on governance systems and institutions in political
science; that is, structures of (overarching) rules and norms that set a context and
operating space for evaluation. Second, evaluation scholars argue that evaluation
systems require stable sets of evaluation actors (Leeuw and Furubo 2008). Debates
on political actors and their constellations, interests, resources, and impacts are,
of course, not new to political science, but have thus far only recently been ap-
plied to evaluation (see Schoenefeld and Jordan 2017). Third, both political science
and evaluation use theoretical approaches as well as a range of methods. Building
a strong analytical framework and applying rigorous methodological approaches is
something that concerns both political scientists and evaluators alike, making for po-
tentially productive cross-fertilisation. Fourth, evaluation scholars have specifically
discussed evaluation purposes and uses, themes that link with debates on evidence-
based policy making in political science (Patton 2008; Pawson 2005; Sanderson
2002; Strassheim and Kettunen 2014). Taken together, all four focal points hold
considerable promise for expanding the political study of evaluation and, in doing
so, generating productive linkages with evaluation studies. This section discusses
extant scholarly debates related to each focal point with a view to the EU.
2.1 Evaluation Institutions (Political Science Perspective)
Institutional innovation in the EU’s evaluation architecture has brought an expan-
sion of evaluation activity and capacity. For example, the European Commission and
its Regulatory Scrutiny Board have endeavoured to harmonise evaluation cultures
(across Directorates-General (DGs)), provide internal methodological support, aid
data collection and comparison, stimulate learning, and encourage meta-evaluation
(Radaelli 2018; Stern 2009). The directorates of the European Parliament and the
new European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) are also engaging in new
and increasing evaluation activity (see Schrefler 2016; Stephenson 2017). In addi-
tion, a wide range of nongovernmental organisations have also become involved
either as evaluation contractors or as independent evaluators, as has been shown,
for example, in the area of climate policy (Huitema et al. 2011; Schoenefeld 2018).
The sum of such wide-ranging activities across a number of institutions may give
rise to a broader evaluation system in the EU, assisted by rules such as a growing
number of evaluation clauses in legislation (see Bussmann 2005). Scholars have also
examined progress in the way that evaluation is institutionalised in various European
countries from the perspectives of political, social and professional systems (Furubo
et al. 2002; Jacob et al. 2015; Stern 2009; Stockmann et al. 2020).
Leeuw and Furubo (2008) consider social systems in and around evaluation as
“evaluation systems” when they are characterised by four criteria: First, the activities
carried out have to be characterised in terms of a certain cultural–cognitive perspec-
tive (Scott 2001). There should be some agreement among the players involved about
what they are actually doing and why they are doing it, or to put it differently, there
must be a shared epistemology. The second criterion is that the evaluation activities
must be carried out by organisations and institutions and not only (or largely) by
“lonely” or sole-trading evaluators. Third, to be labelled as an evaluation system,
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there should be a degree of permanence or history in the activities involved: they
are part of something ongoing. This also means there will be a tendency to replace
ad hoc initiatives and ad hoc organisations with activities and organisations planned
in advance that have a more permanent character. The fourth criterion is that the
information from evaluative activities has to be (institutionally) linked to decision
and implementation processes. This can be the planning process of a government
department, universities, or the World Bank, but it can also be the governmental
budget process or adjustments of the curricula of schools and universities.
Several evaluation authors, including Raimondo (2018), conceive of “evaluation
systems” as different from what political scientists would perhaps normally speak
of as “polities” or “systems of governance.” They distinguish between the system
of performance monitoring; the systems of performance audit, inspection, and over-
sight; the system of (quasi)experimental evaluations and the evidence-based policy
movement; the accreditation and evaluation system; and the monitoring and eval-
uation system. In practice, there are certain risks inherent in evaluation systems
with regards to how they are formalised and institutionalised, and how, in turn,
they become predictable when it comes to procedures, participants and ways of
doing. Evaluation systems can be “captured” in the same way, perhaps, that means
of interest representation and channels of access to policy formulators can also be
captured. When the subjects of evaluation gain too much control over evaluation
questions or even evaluation methodology, it might be said that evaluation systems
have become too integrated with the administrative–political world. Hellstern and
Wollmann (1986) were among the first Europeans to draw attention to this problem.
Such dynamics link closely with the legitimisation of evaluation. One assumption is
that the more that evaluation activities are part of the administrative–social–political
“system,” the more their legitimisation increases. However, with increased legit-
imisation, evaluation’s role in “speaking truth to power” may be diminished (see
Hellstern and Wollmann 1986).
The latter arguments link with a concept introduced in the late 1990s by Michael
Power: rituals of verification (Power 1997). Power referred to this in regard to his
work on (performance) auditing, where the auditors produced rituals that the audi-
tees to some extent valued/loved because they created procedures and ways of doing
things that made life relatively easy (see also Stephenson 2015 with regards to the
European Court of Auditors). A similar concept can be applied to evaluation, in par-
ticular when evaluations merely become administrative “machines” (Dahler-Larsen
2011) that produce (on and on) “similar types of knowledge”/similar languages or
speech-acts. More fundamentally, we should be asking not only what the purpose
of a particular evaluation is, but what purpose the evaluation serves in the polity/
politics/policy process (that is, at a systemic level). This question should not merely
be in terms of accountability or policy learning but should perhaps be connected
more explicitly with notions of problems and solutions (Kingdon 2011). Questions
include (i) Did the policy solve a perceived problem? and (ii) Can an evaluation be
used in such a way to determine this? In sum, the institutional and more systemic
perspectives raise a number of pertinent questions related to the theme of governance
by evaluation.
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2.2 Evaluation Actors and Interests (Political Science Perspective)
A growing debate related to evaluation concerns the actors involved in producing and
conducting evaluations (as well as the users; see below). In principle, as Schoenefeld
and Jordan (2017) have highlighted, both state and nonstate actors have become in-
volved in policy evaluation. Actor attributes have consequences for evaluation—for
example, nonstate actors may be more independent, but they may struggle to bring
their evaluation results into the policy process (Weiss 1993). By the same token,
governmental actors may have greater access both in terms of data for their eval-
uation and in terms of the usage of their findings, but they may be constrained in
other, political ways.
The fact that many evaluations are commissioned, that is, paid for by one actor
and conducted by another, has generated a vibrant debate on principal–agent re-
lationships in evaluation, in part as a function of the differences explained above.
For instance, Pleger and Sager (2018) have argued that such relationships may both
improve and detract from evaluation. This is especially relevant because we have
been observing a changing role and influence of actors as a function of evaluation.
To what extent do political interests affect or underpin their work? It is key to ad-
dress the interplay between evaluation providers, bureaucracies, and political actors
and their needs/demands given the ongoing politicisation of evaluation practice (The
LSE GV314 Group 2013). Key questions include (i) Is there variation in the way
that evaluations are announced, framed, tendered, delivered, and used/not used? and
(ii) Do organisations learn from evaluations? We can answer these questions by
drawing on insights from the evaluation community (e.g. Leeuw 1994) and political
science (Bennett and Howlett 1992; Radaelli and Dunlop 2013).
Extant literatures have often focused on the European Commission (EC) as a key
(institutional) evaluation actor (see Camisão and Vila Maior 2019). But Masten-
broek et al. (2016, p. 1330) claim that systematic evaluation by the Commission
“is not likely to materialize” because evaluations “may uncover critical problems in
the actual working of legislation.” An extensive administrative reform in order to
increase evaluation activities may lead to a harmful internal overload, as it did, for
instance, in the case of the Prodi Commission (see Levy 2006). As for the external
dimension of the EC’s actorness, first, the Better Regulation Agenda established
the “evaluate first” principle, meaning that “for any existing intervention, an eval-
uation should be the starting point of any discussions on performance and possible
(significant) change” (European Commission 2017, p. 327). In other words, before
modifying a piece of legislation, the Commission has to assess the existing evidence
(e.g. already conducted evaluations that relate to the issue). Ideally, this will foster
learning from past experience and link ex post evaluations with ex ante evaluations
(impact assessments), since the former have to be considered in the preparation of
the latter.
But in practice, neither the Commission nor other evaluation actors operate in
isolation. Evaluation has increasingly been understood as a “community of practice,”
which Wenger (2011) defines as “groups of people who share a concern or a passion
for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly” (p. 1).
Indeed, these communities now have their own journals (e.g. Evaluation and the
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American Journal of Evaluation), conduct their own conferences, and have created
their own outputs, such as evaluation standards (see Widmer 2004). A key question
thus becomes how this community interacts with the policy community. These argu-
ments suggest that a significant focus on evaluation actors, their relationships, and
their contexts is warranted.
2.3 Evaluation Design (Evaluation Perspective)
A third important focal point concerns evaluation design, including theory and
methodology. In political science, theory is at the heart of evaluation and, indeed,
is problematic in its own way, at least insofar as understanding of theory and its
usage are fragmented. We can distinguish between theories of policy makers, stake-
holders, and evaluators that underly their professional work in making policies and
doing evaluations, and scientific theories capable of contextualising and explain-
ing the consequences of policies, programmes, and evaluators’ actions (Leeuw and
Donaldson 2015). Much theoretical discussion has taken place over the years in the
Evaluation journal, including suggestions to further stimulate the development of
theoretical work in the evaluation profession: “theory knitting,” “theory layering,”
and “theory-driven evaluation science” (Leeuw and Donaldson 2015, p. 467). Fur-
thermore, the authors assert that there is no such thing as “a” or “the” evaluation
theory currently applied in evaluation and by the evaluation profession.
Perhaps the essential difference between political science and evaluation is that
evaluation is more instrumental and forward-looking, insofar as political scientists
tend to do research and policy analysis of the recent past in order to convincingly
reconstruct that past and thus better understand the actors/institutions and policy
area, although they are often reluctant to predict the future (even if they commonly
demand of theory that it have explanatory power and predictability) or to give rec-
ommendations. Evaluation scholars, by contrast, are more practically oriented, keen
for their work to have real-world practical uptake. They often focus on theorising
individual policies (e.g. programme theory) rather than overarching, societal mech-
anisms (see Rogers et al. 2000).
In spite of these differences, many normative but also practical concerns within
political science research—validity, reliability, replicability, generalisability—can
also be found in evaluation studies. There are disciplinary similarities and key con-
cerns with regard to research design, data collection, and analytical frameworks for
analysis. The quality and value of an evaluation, and indeed its authority and per-
suasiveness and the degree to which it can or cannot be contested, may ultimately
be determined by the strength of its research design.
2.4 Evaluation Purpose and Use (Evaluation Perspective)
A fourth and final focal point of this special issue is the strategic use and political
contestation of evaluation, which requires empirical research in order to examine
the way in which methods, theory, data, and results are accepted or refuted. How
does discourse/dialogue compete with scientific evidence in the deliberative practice
of evaluation? Why is there such political interest in quantification, and how is this
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linked to perceived legitimacy? Political attitudes and perceptions of evaluation’s
relevance affect its use, including in technical impact assessment and day-to-day
politics. How do evaluations vary in scope, from impact assessments and ex post
evaluations to policy reviews? What is the EU’s degree of resilience to political
interference, and how is it coping with misinformation, fake news, and/or poor data
when it comes to assessing policy performance?
Engaging with such questions, evaluation scholars have made significant inroads
into questions of evaluation use (Christie 2007; Henry and Mark 2003; Højlund
2014a, 2014b). Empirical investigations have often identified several challenges.
As Højlund (2014b, p. 26) asserts, “administrators, politicians and citizens have
an interest in knowing to what extent evaluations are used to improve policies,”
but nonetheless, rarely do they change policies. He finds that “justificatory uses do
not fit with evaluation’s objective of policy improvement and social betterment”
(Højlund 2014b, p. 26). Evaluations may be commissioned to legitimise a course
of action or as symbolic politics, or else there may be purposeful “non-use.” We
can also distinguish between “findings use” (from evaluation findings) and “process
use” (use during the evaluation process). Analysing the evaluating organisation and
the factors “conditioning” the evaluation undertaken can often reveal a great deal
about whether or not an evaluation will be used, and if so, how (see Alkin and Taut
2003).
King and Alkin (2018) have theorised evaluation use, recently looking back over
50 years of research on “use theory.” Drawing on work by Miller (2010) and Shadish
et al. (1991), they put forward their own framework that captures those factors that
scholars have focused their attention on when exploring if and how evaluations
are in fact used: operational specificity (explicit details are given about how to
foster evaluation use for studies in specific settings); range of application (explicit
description is provided about where the theory is likely to increase use and where it
is not likely to succeed); feasibility in practice (practitioners can easily and routinely
conduct the activities); discernible impact (the prescribed activities do, in fact, lead
to increased use); and reproducibility (different practitioners can reproduce the same
outcomes at different times and places) (King and Alkin 2018, p. 436).
Some scholars have argued that we should “extend the narrow framing of use
by adding a broader-based construct” (Alkin and King 2017, p. 443). Kirkhart
(2000) suggests that we need a more inclusive understanding of the impact of eval-
uation—one that considers intention (intended or unintended), source (evaluation
process or results), and time (immediate, end-of-cycle, long-term). She proposed
the term “influence” as an addition to “use,” allowing for a better framework to
capture effects that are “multidirectional, incremental, unintentional, and noninstru-
mental, alongside those that are unidirectional, episodic, intended, and instrumental”
(Kirkhart 2000, p. 7). Given that the role of knowledge in politics has also captured
political scientists’ attention, interaction between the relevant literatures holds sig-
nificant promise.
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3 Understanding Policy Evaluation in EU Governance: Contributions
of the Special Issue
As a collective, the articles of this special issue contribute to all four focal points
identified in Sect. 2. In Table 1 we plot the contributions of the special issue,
grouping them by aspects that have traditionally been central to political scientists
(focal points 1 and 2) and aspects on which evaluation scholars and practitioners
have often focused (focal point 3 and 4). Multiple articles in this special issue
address more than one focal point, demonstrating the overlaps and compatibilities
that this special issue seeks to highlight. The remainder of this section introduces
the contributions to each focal point in more detail.
3.1 Evaluation Institutions: their Emerging Cultures and Systems
At an institutional level, Jankauskas and Eckhard (2019) demonstrate how the
Juncker Commission’s Better Regulation Reform (BRR) has redefined the “tools
and rules” of evaluation within the Commission. The reform has introduced and
strengthened norms such as the “evaluate first” principle, and it uses public consul-
tations as well as the newly created Regulatory Scrutiny Board to further deepen
and legitimise evaluation practice within the Commission. In a similar vein, Pat-
tyn et al. (2019) demonstrate how the introduction of new public management in
Table 1 Towards a categorization of policy evaluation in EU governance based on the existing literature
and including the contributions of this special issue
Political Science concerns/perspective Evaluation concerns/perspective
Focal Point 1—
Evaluation institu-
tions
Focal Point 2—
Evaluation actors
and interests
Focal Point 3—
Evaluation design
(methods and theory)
Focal Point 4—
Evaluation purpose
and use
Area of potential contestation/evaluation activity
– institutional innova-
tion
– organisation of
and mandate for
evaluation
– scrutiny of evalu-
ation conduct and
quality
– adoption of techni-
cal and professional
norms in evaluation
practice
– writing rules and
evaluation tenders
– role and influence
of administration
– management of
evaluation findings
– input of evaluation
into policy design
– evaluation frame-
works and method-
ologies
– data collection and
interpretation
– beliefs/logics of
intervention/cause
and effect
– strategic use (or
not) of findings
by executive and
legislature at EU,
nat/reg/local level
– symbolic politics
– rejection and dele-
gitimization
Relevant author contribution
Jankauskas & Eckhard
Pattyn, Brans &
De Peutter
Schoenefeld, Schulze,
Hilden & Jordan
Jankauskas & Eckhard
Hoerner
Pattyn, Brans &
De Peutter
Dahler-Larsen &
Sundby
Potluka
Schoenefeld, Schulze,
Hilden & Jordan
De Francesco
Pattyn, Brans &
De Peutter
Hoerner
Dahler Larsen-Sundby
Source: own compilation, based on existing literature
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Belgium has increased the number of times that ministers have formally called for
evaluation. Their work demonstrates how new rules—in part driven by the wider
evidence-based movements across Europe—changed governmental behaviour.
Institutional innovation has also appeared in other areas of EU policy making, as
the example of the EU’s Monitoring Mechanism for Greenhouse Gases and Poli-
cies and Measures demonstrates (Schoenefeld et al. 2019). The authors unpack how
policy monitoring—potentially a key ingredient to evaluation—is itself subject to
institutional dynamics and change, implementation issues, and debates on quality.
Monitoring should not simply be assumed as a feature of implementation (as many
have done), but rather it should be subject to careful study and (eventually) pol-
icy design. The empirical example of climate policy monitoring in the EU reveals
that institutional path dependencies loom large, but there are also learning effects
in monitoring that can be identified in both quantitative and qualitative analyses
(Schoenefeld et al. 2019).
3.2 Evaluation Actors and Interests: their Evolving Role and Influence
Construing the European Commission as an evaluation actor, Jankauskas and Eck-
hard (2019) demonstrate how the Better Regulation Agenda, in addition to deepening
institutionalisation of evaluation in the Commission (see above), has also strength-
ened its “strategic actorness.” More specifically, multiple tools mentioned above
have streamlined evaluation within the Commission, making it more internally co-
herent and, in addition, externally able to justify its policy decisions by the means of
evaluation. There is thus evidence that the activism of the Commission to institute
evaluation is generating effects, such as a considerably lower number of legislative
proposals. Likewise, Hoerner (2019) demonstrates how political parties have used
evaluations in order to pursue their political interests.
But actors with an interest in evaluation may also be constrained by their sub-
stantive policy field, as Pattyn et al. (2019) demonstrate in the case of Flanders in
Belgium. Some policy fields, such as the environment or mobility and public works,
drew a large number of demands for evaluations by ministers. Furthermore, the ev-
idence suggests that ministers cite more evaluation demand in policy fields where
there is substantial EU funding, pointing to multilevel interactions.
3.3 Evaluation Design: the Challenges in Evaluation and Impact Assessment
There are multiple ways in which politics and evaluation design, that is, its theory
and methods, are intertwined. For starters, Dahler-Larsen and Sundby (2019) remind
us that “hope is not the same as reality” (see article in this special issue) when it
comes to producing high-quality evaluations. They argue that low evaluability can at
times be viewed as politically propitious if the goal is to leave a policy unchanged.
Drawing on the example of EU occupational health and safety regulation and its
implementation in Denmark, they demonstrate that the nature of the legislation can
make evaluation difficult, for example when there are no clear targets to evaluate
against, when there is no clear programme theory, and when there is little focus on
effectiveness and little data available. In sum, significant methodological challenges
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may lie in the wait long before an evaluation begins; for those interested in keeping
the status quo and avoiding potentially uncomfortable evaluation results, this may
be a desired outcome (Dahler-Larsen and Sundby 2019).
A second theme emerging from this special issue is a focus on data quality and
collaboration between different data-generating or data-sharing institutions. For ex-
ample, Potluka (2019) demonstrates that although more data are becoming available
in the area of EU environmental cohesion policy in the Czech Republic, sometimes
their comparability is limited, and it can be difficult to obtain data from different pub-
lic institutions. Such issues generate significant challenges for evaluators. Problems
with comparability and quality have also long bedevilled climate policy monitoring
in the EU, as Schoenefeld et al. (2019) demonstrate in their analysis. The authors
were unable to compare quantitative ex ante policy estimates across sectors with
national targets; however, increases in quantification over time demonstrate learning
effects among the member states.
Finally, de Francesco (2019) demonstrates a certain level of stability of evaluation
practice, in terms of its evaluation approaches and methods, in a meta-analysis of
52 evaluations focusing on EU railway policy. Even though new public management
and efforts at evidence-based policy making had long arrived in the EU, he demon-
strates that this has not driven significant changes in evaluation practice. Therefore,
institutional changes (see Sect. 3.1 above) do not necessarily drive changes in eval-
uative practice, necessitating careful empirical analysis.
3.4 Evaluation Purpose and Use: the Strategies of Political Actors
Policy evaluations are neither merely technical tools nor are they unpolitical. The
contributions to this special issue identified several ways in which the purposes
and uses of evaluation intertwine with politics. In the case of Flanders in Bel-
gium, Pattyn et al. (2019) analysed to what extent government ministers focused on
policy planning, accountability, and policy learning in their evaluation announce-
ments and found that about one-third of the evaluations were orientated towards
policy planning, two-thirds towards learning, and only a small number towards ac-
countability. Therefore, the professed claims that new public management reforms
generate greater accountability do not appear to be true in this case, although a fo-
cus on learning and policy improvement can point to potentially positive impacts of
evaluation.
Strategic use of evaluation results also becomes very clear when considering par-
liaments. Studying six national parliaments over 20 years, Hoerner (2019) demon-
strates that members of parliament from Eurosceptic parties were particularly prone
to citing evaluations of EU policies, while their counterparts from Europhile parties
were much less inclined to do so. Furthermore, the more Eurosceptic the environ-
ment, the more evaluations were cited. According to Hoerner (2019), this suggests
a high level of politicisation of evaluations. These findings chime with those of
Dahler-Larsen and Sundby (2019), who similarly suggest that low evaluability can
be a tool to drive certain types of (non-)use of evaluation. In sum, there are multiple
purposes and uses of policy evaluation; the contributions in this special issue have
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focused on providing concrete, empirical evidence in this area, where politics have
often been cited but rarely been demonstrated.
4 Conclusions and Future Directions
Policy evaluation is a growing area of policy-making, conceptual debate, and practice
in the EU. Related activities take place in various spaces, contexts, and communi-
ties, a situation that has, in turn, led to considerable fragmentation. This special
issue addresses this problematic state of affairs by bringing together insights from
political science and evaluation studies. It structures these debates around four focal
areas, namely (1) evaluation institutions, (2) evaluation actors, (3) evaluation de-
sign (methods and theory), and (4) evaluation purpose and use. Policy evaluation
is clearly a growing field of conceptual development and practice in the EU, but
understanding its totality necessitates more systematic approaches and work across
different communities. We hope that this special issue contributes to this endeavour.
One concluding observation is that institutional dynamics of policy evaluation
generally remain under-researched, as evidenced not only in this special issue but
also more broadly in relevant public policy journals. Evaluation has so far grown
organically and often in an ad hoc fashion, driven by demands in particular sub-
stantive policy fields, by political pressures, or by the skilful activities of policy
entrepreneurs. This has generated a veritable patchwork of activity, with system-
atising efforts so far largely focusing on evaluation design as driven by national
and European evaluation organisations. The nascent efforts by the European Com-
mission, the European Environment Agency, and several national governments to
systematise evaluation in various ways deserve more attention (for an international
review in the area of energy policy, see Schoenefeld and Rayner 2019). Efforts
such as the BRR (Jankauskas and Eckhard 2019), with its specific expression of the
Regulatory Scrutiny Board (Radaelli 2018), represent profound efforts at reshap-
ing EU politics and policy making by the means of evaluation and defining of the
overarching rules of such processes. To remain at the forefront of developments in
the field of evaluation, scholars not only need to understand them better, but they
also must develop an ability to articulate governance alternatives (Schoenefeld and
Jordan 2017). Comparative perspectives may be a useful approach to explore the
rule changes enacted at various governance levels.
Greater cross-fertilisation between the political science and the evaluation com-
munities will be necessary to achieve such progress. Many of the evaluation design
advances, discussed in journals such as Evaluation and the American Journal of
Evaluation, are likely to bear relevance for political scientists seeking to understand
public policies, their underlying mechanisms, and their effects. Evaluation scholars
and evaluators stand to gain from insights into political science research on institu-
tions; actors and their characteristics, including political behaviour; and also novel
theoretical lenses and conceptual frameworks. Decades ago, Carol Weiss highlighted
the political nature of policy evaluation (Weiss 1970), but conceptual developments
that address the mounting fragmentation in knowledge on policy evaluation have
been few. We hope that this special issue takes one step in the right direction of
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rectifying this state of affairs. We would like to invite scholars to move beyond
our categorisation, addressing issues such as the relationship between power and
evaluation, questions of agency in politics, and the longer-term role of evaluation as
a governance tool in the EU.
Furthermore, a range of rapid technological developments, including digitalisa-
tion, big data and artificial intelligence are likely to become new opportunities for
evaluators in terms of assessing policy impact, as well as for those seeking to under-
stand politicisation. Hoerner’s (2019) contribution in this special issue demonstrates
the valuable insights that automated, large-scale quantiative analyses can deliver, and
future scholars should extend such approaches to other areas of social life beyond
formal political institutions, such as social media.
At a time when the EU institutions have come under intense pressure in these
times of austerity, rising populism, Euroscepticism, and growing political and soci-
etal demands to deliver in substantial policy fields such as climate change, a greater
focus on evaluation is paramount. Evaluation could be the key to accountability and
learning, and in time to more efficient, cost-effective, and sustainable policy, as well
as to achieving greater impact. Our combined knowledge on such efforts—as well as
potential alternatives—is only just emerging in a more systematic fashion. Whether
these efforts will be successful remains the stuff of future research—endeavours to
which, we hope, this special issue contributes a solid foundation.
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